Archive for the ‘Social Entrepreneurship’ Category
The Benefits of Doing Well, and Doing Good
Can companies do well by doing good? To my mind, almost all companies are able to make profits while solving a problem rooted in society. For instance, Hemant Sahal, a VIT University undergraduate, has created Callmat, a chemical product which makes water fit for drinking. Sahal’s business has great potential to thrive, because the product is cheap and can solve a common problem in India. In an interview by the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia, Sahal claimed that if he can not invest the profits made in society, he will have failed in his project.
According to Rosabeth Moss Kanter, who writes here, if a company can integrate the benefits that it offers society more closely into its existing business, that integration can be very sensible and beneficial for the business. Moreover, she highlights that some smart companies are finding that including a focus on benefiting society in their mission can help yield competitive advantage by creating a corporate culture that leads to high performance and profits.
On the other hand, Kanter argues that there are a number of reasons why incorporating social good into strategy can improve a company’s long- term performance.
- Can help motivate employees.
- Help to maintain a cohesive culture despite the diversity.
- Can help spark innovative thinking by exposing employees to new ideas and perspectives.
Also, the writer points out that the reason many companies now want to enter emerging markets is because those markets are growing. But companies are discovering that there are so many social and environmental needs in emerging markets and those needs can be a good source of new product or service ideas that people will pay for. For instance, in November 2006, Danone launched a yoghurt called Shoktidoi, designed to provide a response to the nutritional needs of Bangladeshi children at an affordable price.
Furthermore, for surviving, companies have to do some good for society to continue doing well financially. Fundamentally, companies that are not somehow doing good will eventually have problems. For Kanter, information about a company’s behavior anywhere in the world is more readily available to people all around the globe. That is why most companies try to invest part of their benefits in their Corporate Social Responsibility programs.
In conclusion, Kanter agrees that thinking about creating societal benefits through business should be part of setting strategy. If, as a business leader, you start thinking deeply about growing your company, in the future that means thinking about unsolved problems and unmet needs. Solving some of those problems and addressing some of those needs can, if done well, benefit both your company and the larger world.
Three Mistakes Made in scaling Up New Ventures
Most organizations feel that the job is done when they have successfully prototyped the first product or the initial service and are now selling to the first outlet or set of users. They’ve defined success as developing something customers want.
But reality is much different. The journey has just begun. Many fledgling companies and many ventures within established companies fail to capitalize on successful prototypes because they make one strategic error: they do not understand scale-up. In this post Robert Moore looks at three common mistakes in the transition from promising start-up to full scale venture.
Charles Baden-Fuller and Ian MacMillan recently wrote for the Harvard Business Review blog on a topic that is very important to every one of the businesses here at Villgro. From Coir Atlas which provides bamboo/jute alternatives for the wood separators used in steel transportation to a rural BPO called Desicrew, all of the Villgro Incubatees have or will realize a need to shift their customers and products if they are going to scale.
In just this last month I have seen each of these issues in many of the Indian social businesses. While this article talks about the difficulty in scaling correctly in general it is vital that the social enterprise sector think about these concepts early on especially because the social goals they want to meet makes this transition to scale even more complex.
The three basic concepts introduced by Baden-Fuller and MacMillan are
- Realize your customers are not the same as users
- Recognize that first users are not the same as scaling users
- Anticipate that first products are not the same as scaling products
While it is easy to see the user of your product as the customer it is also important to look for other revenue streams that might not be the end user. If you take Wonder Grass for an example, their goal is to sell their affordable housing product to both the village end user and to other organizations that will provide the houses to the end users. If Wonder Grass solely relied on the ability for the villagers to buy their product then it would take much longer to grow to scale.
The authors’ second and third points are where complexity develops in the social enterprise sector. Many social businesses have a particular customer or user in mind when starting the business because of the social benefit they hope to create. When starting small it might be easy to reach your intended user but growing to scale can involve issues with unmanageable distribution channels or even being tempted to focus on a more accessible user who isn’t as bad off and won’t provide as much of a social benefit. Another complexity of this space is that normally the transition from your first to your scaling products would indicate an increase in revenue potential but in the social enterprise space sometimes it means taking a cut in the ultimate earning potential your company can make, especially if that transition involves trading financial return for a social one.
In this sector there are a lot of companies who have taken many years to figure out who their scaling user or what their scaling product and the only reason they are still in business is because they have been supported by the entrepreneur’s previous successes or been given grants to address the social need they are trying to impact. The rest of these social enterprises however do not have the luxury of wasting time and if they aren’t careful will find themselves with customers, users, or a product that does not scale. If they take these ideas of scale into account now the issue of scale will be much easier to accomplish and they will be able to successfully take their impact to the next level.
ANDE Impact Report
In a previous blog post, Devyani Srinivasan wrote about the Dangers of Poor Research. In a follow-up post, she examines another research report brought out by the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE), drawing our attention to some limitations of the report. Devyani is an independent consultant. This article was originally published on her personal blog, Devyani Writes.
In an earlier post, I had pointed out some weaknesses in the research methodologies of the Ashoka and Beyond Profit surveys of social entrepreneurs. At around the same time that the results of these two surveys were published, ANDE also published its own impact report. ANDE is the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs. How does their report compare to the Ashoka and Beyond Profit surveys?
In brief, the ANDE report is more transparent about how it arrived at its results than the Ashoka and Beyond Profit surveys. However, there is some variability in the completeness and clarity with which the data is presented.
Although ANDE’s report describes itself as an “impact report”, it is really only two sections that are about ANDE’s work. In addition, there is no mention of the methodology used to collect the data in these two sections. Despite the strengths of the report, this is a major weakness.
The two sections that are on ANDE’s work are titled, “ANDE’s Role and the Impact of Our Members”, and “ANDE’s Efforts To Grow The Sector To Scale”. Of these, the latter section consists of straightforward reporting on ANDE’s activities over the year. Therefore I will focus only on the section titled, “ANDE’s Role and the Impact of Our Members”.
In this section, it is Figures 9-14 that I would like to comment on. All figures report results in terms of percentages. In my earlier post I had said that the problem with using percentages alone is that we have no way of knowing if these results are due to chance, because these results were not tested using a test like the chi-square or t-test. However, I realized that I need to explain this further.
Chi-squares or t-tests are needed if you are collecting data from a sample of respondents, and using your results to generalize about the larger population that they (supposedly) represent. Using percentages is not a problem if you have collected data on the entire universe that you are studying. Look at Figure 13 of the ANDE report, for example. The figure is titled, “How ANDE Members Fund SGBs’ Financial Needs”. We are told earlier in the text that ANDE members who invest in SGBs (Small and Growing Businesses) manage 51 funds (23/24). The N=51 at the bottom of Figure 13 tells us that data from all 51 funds is represented in this figure.
Similarly, Figure 11 is also quite clear. It shows how many ANDE member funds have a target return range of 0-5%, 5-20% and above 20%. Here, as in Figure 13, the universe should be 51, as that is the number of funds that ANDE members investing in SGBs manage. However, it is explained that for this figure N=48, as three ANDE member funds did not provide their target IRR range. The only flaw in this figure is its titling. It is titled, “ANDE intermediary target benefit: Percent of ANDE member funds with target IRR range”. This suggests that respondents were asked a yes/no question, such as, “Do you have a target IRR range?” Instead, respondents were probably asked a question like, “What is your target IRR range?” and their responses indicate the spread of ranges. In addition, IRR is not defined in the figure, nor is there a glossary.
Other figures are more ambiguous. There is no N given for Figure 10. Since the title of the figure is, “ANDE intermediary target size: Percent of ANDE member funds with target average investment size”, should we assume that N=51? The title also suggests a yes/no question as with Figure 11. Figures 12 and 14 both say that N=70, and includes both funds and capacity building providers. Yet the term “capacity building providers” is not explained anywhere else in this section.
The text in this section is well-supported by footnotes, and doesn’t leave room for misinterpretation. Where the report says that, “ANDE members have made 2,499 investments in SGBs totaling $830 million (26/27)”, we can see from footnote 15 that this information was collected from all 51 ANDE member funds. Where it says that, “33 ANDE members spent $96.8 million on technical-assistance activities (26/27)”, footnote 17 tells us that data was not available for the remaining ANDE members. And the $1.7 billion in additional funding that ANDE portfolio companies have secured is, as footnote 19 tells us, based on reporting by 21 funds.
It is important to note that, as in some of the above examples, ANDE has most likely underreported their results rather than extrapolate where data is not available. This is to be appreciated. The one exception I found, where the footnote did not explain the text well, was 16. If you read the text and the footnote together, it says, “Among those funds that reported historical investment-size information for these past investments, 96 percent of the total number of investments made were investments under $2 million (26/27)”, excluding one ANDE member fund representing 450 investments that did not report quantity under $2 million. We don’t know what the total number of respondents was (those that reported historical investment-size information), and we also don’t know why one fund was excluded.
The Dangers of Poor Research
In this blog post, Devyani Srinivasan, an indepdent consultant, takes a look at some of the issues to be aware of while conducting social enterprise research. This post was originally published on her personal blog, Devyani Writes.
In the last year, Ashoka and Intellecap’s Beyond Profit have both conducted surveys of social entrepreneurs. Ashoka describes itself as the global association of the world’s leading social entrepreneurs, whom it elects as Fellows. The Ashoka survey was conducted to understand how their Fellows have changed systems. This phrasing already suggests a bias that Ashoka Fellows have changed systems, one that is carried through in the way the survey was designed and conducted.
Beyond Profit is the social enterprise magazine of Intellecap, a social investment advisory firm. Their survey was conducted to better understand social enterprises, and the people who lead them, in India. While India is described as having a high degree of social entrepreneurship, it lags behind in research in this field. Therefore, initiatives to conduct research on social entrepreneurship in India are much needed. However, this initiative by Beyond Profit, along with the survey by Ashoka, are marred by weak research methods.
The first limitation to both the Beyond Profit and Ashoka surveys is that neither of them go beyond percentages in reporting on the results. For example, the Beyond Profit survey reports on the percentage of respondents who are men (and women), who fall within a certain age group, and whose work falls within a certain sector. The Ashoka survey says of their Fellows that, “these people are incredibly focused on achieving their goals with 93% pursuing their original objective after 10 years. 80% of them are seen as leaders in their field and 90+% of their ideas are replicated by other groups” (4/6). The Ashoka survey also calculates the percentage of Fellows who have changed the system in one of five ways.
The problem is that we have no way of knowing if these results are due to chance. If the authors had conducted a chi square or t-test on their results, it would give us the probability that these results are due to chance. For example, a probability of 0.001 would mean that the results are highly significant in statistical terms, that is, the results are very probably true.
In addition, these tests only work if you have a random sample, and there is good reason to believe that in neither the Ashoka nor Beyond Profits surveys was this the case. Out of all the Ashoka Fellows elected in 1998,1999, 2003 and 2004, the total number of Fellows with current contact information from those years is 315. 172 of those Fellows returned surveys, and this was used to calculate a response rate of 55%. However, we don’t know how many Fellows current contact information is not available for. This is especially important because it is quite likely that the Fellows for whom current contact information is not available may be those whose social enterprises have closed down or are inactive.
The Beyond Profit survey was conducted using an online platform, and was distributed to Intellecap’s database of social entrepreneurs in India, as well as to the networks of Ashoka, Dasra and Unltd India. The sample size for this survey is 118, as that is the number of people who responded. However, as readers we do not know the universe from which this sample was selected. How many people was the survey distributed to? Do Intellecap’s database, as well as the networks of Ashoka, Dasra and Unltd India, cover all social entrepreneurs in India? Alternatively, was the survey only distributed to a sample of social entrepreneurs to begin with?
As it was up to these social entrepreneurs to respond to the survey, it is quite likely that all those who did are similar to one another in some way. For example, they might be all in a younger age group, and therefore more comfortable with using the Internet to respond to surveys. Therefore this sample is unlikely to be random, and most probably suffers from what is known as self-selection bias.
There is one section in the Beyond Profit survey in which it is acknowledged that those omitted from the survey are likely to have influenced its results. The report states that, “One element to keep in mind is what the data doesn’t tell us. Because we didn’t survey people who almost became entrepreneurs, but didn’t follow through because of negative reactions from family, it is difficult to judge just how prevalent family pressure is” (5/7). However, those omitted from the survey are likely to have influenced all of its results, and this is not acknowledged throughout most of the report.
As long as social enterprises in India do not have their own dedicated legal form(s), it may be difficult to know how many social entrepreneurs there actually are. In a context in which a comprehensive database of social entrepreneurs in India is not available, it makes sense for Intellecap to use their own database and other networks to contact potential respondents. In fact, this is a legitimate research method and is known as snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is suitable for qualitative research, where the main purpose is to gain a rich and complex understanding of a specific social context or phenomenon. The problem is that the Intellecap survey seems to use this method for quantitative research, where the emphasis is on eliciting data that can be generalized to other geographical areas or populations.
For example, the Intellecap survey says that “…there are actually more men than women in social enterprise today” (2/4). Similar statements, which generalize from the sample to the universe of Indian social entrepreneurs, are made throughout the report, including with regard to age, experience, motivation, revenue generation and sector. However, without a random sample, and without testing for the statistical significance of the findings, it is misleading to make these generalizations.
Another limitation that both the Ashoka and Beyond Profit surveys suffer from is the lack of triangulation. In the social sciences, triangulation refers to using more than two methods in a study to double (or triple) check the results. The Ashoka survey, in which Fellows were self-reporting on their achievements, could have certainly benefited from triangulation. In the Beyond Profit survey, triangulation could have been particularly useful in cross-checking certain pieces of information, such as on revenue generation.
A final area in which the Beyond Profit survey errs is in the statement:
…Not surprisingly, people from a for-profit background are more likely to choose a
for-profit structure for their own social enterprise. 63% of respondents who came
from a for-profit business background chose to work in a for-profit structure, while
only 17% of people with non-profit experience switched to a for-profit structure (3/5).”
The claim that, “people from a for-profit background are more likely to choose a for-profit structure for their own social enterprise” leads us to believe that there is a correlation between the background of social entrepreneurs and the legal structure they choose for their social enterprises. However, establishing a correlation between these two phenomena requires regression analysis.
The simplest form of regression is linear. If you plot the data collected on a graph, regression analysis will create a single line that best summarizes the distribution of points. The typical distance between the line and all the points indicates whether the regression analysis has captured a relationship that is strong or weak. There is no evidence of regression analysis in the Beyond Profit report.
In addition, the statement discussed above begins with the words “not surprisingly”. This suggests that it is because a social entrepreneur used to work in a for-profit that he / she chose the same legal structure for his / her social enterprise. When one variable (in this case, legal structure of social enterprise) is inferred to be because of another variable (in this case, background of social entrepreneur), this is known as causation. Causation cannot be measured from this study because both the variables were measured together in a setting.
One of my former colleagues described the Ashoka report as impressive and inspiring, and I don’t mean to detract from the achievements of their Fellows by pointing out the weaknesses in the research. A strong research methodology would have made these achievements even more impressive, as they would have been supported by firm evidence.
Clean Sweep: Supporting Entrepreneurs in the Energy Sector
In this day and age, most of the world is worried about climate change. That is why instead of delivering energy through top-down initiatives like large-scale utilities, E+Co looks for small enterprises that can take hold locally. Rather than bringing in Western business experts, it hires regional field staff who recruit and support entrepreneurs in their own communities. Moreover, its efforts are inspiring others to see the connections between energy, poverty, and climate change. Alvaro Illanas Cerezo summarizes Susie Boss’s article “Clean Sweep” from Stanford Social Innovation Review, below.
Energizing entrepreneurs
E+Co’s portfolio proves that there’s no shortage of clean energy ideas or entrepreneurs in emerging markets.
A report stated that willing entrepreneurs represent an abundant but largely untapped resource. It also noted, however, that technical assistance for small business is simply not available in many developing markets.
E+Co unleashes this entrepreneurial potential with a three-part model that combines technical assistance with capital.
- Part 1: It helps entrepreneurs develop solid business plans. Field staff use a toolkit and their understanding of local issues to help would-be entrepreneurs analyze their market and select clean energy products. The business development process is thorough but not over-sophisticated. Similarly, the organization prefers proven solutions to cutting edge technologies.
- Part 2: It lends seed capital, typically $25,000 to $500,000 at average annual interest rates ranging from 8 to 12 percent. Getting to yes requires approval from an independent, unpaid investment committee made up of finance professionals. The experts bring a deep understanding of niche energy markets and small- to medium-sized enterprises.
- Part 3: It provides access to growth capital.
Measuring everything
E+Co relies on concrete metrics to convince diverse investors to fund the organization. A triple bottom line scorecard rolls up data from 30 indicators across three categories: financial, social, and environmental. E+Co admits that it can be swayed by stories of lives improved, but he’s also hard-nosed about numbers, and so looks to the scorecard to see that the portfolio’s average annual return is 8 percent.
Grant funding has become a smaller piece of the pie now that loan repayments generate revenue to reinvest.
E+Co is similarly analytical when it comes to evaluating risk. Although the organization steers clear of untested energy ideas, it sometimes approves demonstration projects that bring proven products to new markets.
Growing the space between
E+Co must now make sure the funds keep flowing. Its loans fall into what its CEO calls the space in between: bigger than microfinance but smaller than corporate-size deals. This “missing middle” is unfamiliar territory for many public and private investors. The main goal is to start a movement, so that small and growing enterprises have ready access to capital. Global acceptance of microfinance has taught E+Co the value of aggregating players to speak with one voice.
Have you had any experience in supporting small businesses in the energy sector? Share your experience with us in the comments section.
What Social Enterprises Can Learn from India’s UID Project
UIDAI, based in New Delhi and chaired by Infosys Technologies Ltd co-founder Nilekani, aims to assign 12-digit universal identity numbers to more than 600 million citizens over the next four years. This article in the Mint describes the current team, the significance of the UID, and the challenges the program faces as it starts the first large scale national tests over the next six months. In this piece, Robert Moore talks about what social enterprises can learn from India’s UID project.
Here at Villgro our incubatee companies not only spend a lot of time figuring out how to successfully market new products or business strategies to rural India but also how to learn from their mistakes when they fail. An issue that all of them come across is that the Indian market is disparate which forces them to incorporate tweaks in their marketing plan for each area that they want to market to. This causes trouble when trying to quickly scale their companies but our incubatees are not alone, with large MNCs dealing with this same problem and most recently the Unique Identification Authority of India as it launches its first large scale national test.
The unique identity program, also called Aadhaar, is a program designed to assign a 12-digit identity number to a majority of Indian citizens over the next four years. Coming from the USA where we have the social security number, I can definitely see how having a UIN will make the lives of Indian citizens better – especially those who have no other formal means of identification such as passports or drivers licenses.
But the social implications don’t end there. This is a massive undertaking in marketing and something this big will truly provide some great opportunities to learn more about the Indian market. To complete this task an advisory team has been formed which includes Kiran Khalap – Founder of Chlorophyll brand consulting firm, D.K. Bose – one of India’s most experienced social marketers, Praveen Tripathy – President of Pidlite Industries which is regarded as one of the smartest marketing companies in the country, Santosh Desai – chair of Futurebrands, and Sumeet Vohra – marketing head of Proctor and Gamble India.
There is a great quote by D.K. Bose on the project that goes “Marketing quite often is seen as an effort towards profiteering, an effort towards extorting people’s motivation. This, meanwhile, is concept marketing, value marketing, intangible marketing. When you promote education, you don’t say ‘I’m marketing education’. You’re marketing certain values and concepts.” This quote is significant because it describes a challenge the social entrepreneurs in India also face every day. I often feel that they aren’t given the credit they deserve as they are not only creating profitable businesses in difficult markets but molding values and introducing new concepts as well.
As the Unique Identifier Authority spends the next six months launching a learning program and a large scale national test, social entrepreneurs should pay close attention to its successes and failures as it will provide valuable learning for how to ultimately reach more and more of the many markets that make up India.
The University as a Center of Innovation
In this article, Villgro Fellow Jeanne Chen explores the role that universities play in social enterprise and innovation.
Innovators are everywhere – from slum dwellers who find new uses for waste materials to technology developers. However, not all innovations can be commercialized, and at the same time, many great innovations are left uncapitalized. It remains a difficult task for social investors and innovators to find each other.
One innovation ecosystem which has drawn a lot of attention is Silicon Valley’s university-driven model. Academic research centers are the perfect, fertile ground for incubating potential great ideas and turn them into viable innovations. The only question is how do we replicate the Silicon Valley model elsewhere. As the New York Times article “The Idea Incubator Goes to Campus” reports, a number of university campuses are establishing “proof-of-concept” centers to help test and develop great ideas. While certain top research-heavy universities (e.g., Harvard, MIT, Stanford) already have strong technology transfer support systems for their innovators, many other universities around the country are beginning to adopt the model. Most recently, the US government has allocated $12 million to funding this proof-of-concept model.
These proof-of-concept centers are a bottoms-up approach to funding innovations. Directly at the source of where many great ideas are born, the incubator centers in universities help innovators realize ideas that may not have been carried forward otherwise. The NY Times article provides a number of great examples of innovations which have flourished with the help of tech transfer and incubating experts. Lantos Technologies (www.lantostechnologies.com), which makes a 3-D scanner was the brainchild of an MIT professor, who might not have commercialized the idea if not for the support of MIT’s Deshpande Center for Technological Innovation. The Deshpande Center is just one of many across the US, which provides consulting advice for innovators on how to commercialize their idea from providing support for technology transfers to raising capital.
It seems to me that there are few key advantages to this university innovation model:
- Universities are the nature breeding ground for great ideas – the free flow of information between students, faculty, and visiting lecturers is more likely to spawn innovative thinking than anywhere else
- Academic centers offer a ready support network for development – academic centers tend to be a microcosm of expertise that exist in the real world, condensed onto a small parcel of land
- Participants of university life have more time to dedicate to innovations – one of the challenges of following through with an innovative idea is balancing that work with the quotidian job that is your sustainable livelihood
Therefore, the logical thing to do, as the US has begun to do is:
- 1. Establish support centers to help develop and test ideas – employ experts in technology transfer or venture fundraising to guide likely innovators and entrepreneurs
- 2. Create capacity building programs to encourage more innovative thinking – have classes on innovative design, entrepreneurship, and venture creation
- 3. Create an ecosystem of innovation exchange between universities – allow for the collaboration between innovators at multiple universities, who have different realms of technological expertise
While the academic innovation hub concept is starting to grow in the US, this concept is still relatively foreign in India. Although social enterprise has bloomed within the last 5 years on college campuses, with many of the new innovations coming out of IITs and IIMs, there still remains a large gap between the innovators and social investors. Some campuses are luckier than others, like IIT Madras that has the support of Rural Technology & Business Incubator (RTBI), which has incubated a number of successful social enterprises. Yet, the majority of India’s campuses remain an untapped wealth of bright ideas.
Enter Villgro’s My Idea Program and capacity building program. I was immediately reminded of these more under the radar programs that Villgro operates when I read the article. The My Idea Program hosts capacity building workshops at regional technology universities, helping young entrepreneurs understand how to get started on their own ideas. Villgro is also piloting a social entrepreneurship minor with IIT Madras, which allows some of the brightest engineering minds in the country to think about their ideas within the context of social entrepreneurship. While, these initiatives are still nascent, an expansion of such programs across India would certainly help to diminish some of the gap between great ideas and commercially viable innovations.
How Social Ventures can be Learning Laboratories
In a time of economic crisis, it is crucial that business entrepreneurs focus their innovations on the long-term effects. Previously, capital market innovations have focused on short-term profit, resulting in permanent damage to the economy. In their article, “Social Ventures as Learning Labs,” J. Gregory Dees points to how social ventures can be useful “learning laboratories” in which innovative business ideas can be tested without distorting markets. Rachel Padmanabhan, provides an overview of his article.
A decrease in economic opportunities exacerbates other social problems and in turn reverses progress made by impoverished families. This financial stress has proven to result in tension within communities, fewer children attending school, and inadequate health care. In order to make any improvement on these super-sensitive social and environmental problems, the markets must turn to social entrepreneurship.
Innovation by social entrepreneurs can reverse the pattern of destructive markets by focusing on the social impact that innovations can offer. Social entrepreneurship also allows experimentation of innovations that could potentially solve many issues on a small scale, while effectively working to achieve a larger goal. Social entrepreneurs, Dees says, provide what has been called a “learning laboratory” for these innovative business methods to be tested without negatively impacting the market. The resulting successful models can then be replicated and scaled to create a greater social impact.
The primary difference between these social entrepreneurs and others in the business world lies within their motives. While profit-seeking business entrepreneurs and corporations measure financial success quantitatively, social entrepreneurs measure success by the opportunities they create for the future. An example Dees points out to is 2006 Nobel Prize winner Muhammed Yunus and Grameen Bank that focused on micro-credit with the goal to alleviate poverty. While Bangladeshi officials did not see this as a substantial business opportunity, microfinance is now growing in popularity among mainstream business entrepreneurs and financial entities. Decades after the initial idea of microfinance, markets are beginning to acknowledge the viability of this method as an effective business opportunity.
Implementation of creative business models paired with resourcefulness is necessary in order for entrepreneurs to succeed. Recently within social venture business models, there has been a growing trend away from reliance on subsidies towards commercial strategies. Reliance on solely either of these funding methods is hardly optimal for social entrepreneurs to succeed. In order to create sustainable ventures, entrepreneurs must utilize a mixture of both commercial and philanthropic methods. As proven by VisionSpring, a non-profit organization in China, low-cost technologies paired with innovative business models are an effective way to both provide affordable products and create sustainable job opportunities.
The aforementioned application of these “learning laboratory” experimental innovative models to other businesses requires them to be replicated as well as scaled. This means that in order to be considered valuable, it is necessary that they be cost-effective and transferable as well as socially-impacting. However, entrepreneurs can also benefit from recognizing the failures and patterns of these experimental business models and applying new knowledge to future innovations. As financial crisis pushes businesses towards innovation, it can be expected that the growth trend towards social entrepreneurship will continue due to necessity. If this trend persists, many of the social and environmental issues that have been attributed to capitalistic markets in the past can be alleviated over time.
Read the original article here.
Is All Entrepreneurship Social?
In all the talk of social entrepreneurship, we often forget the social value that regular entrepreneurs hold. While their enterprise, or innovative product may not be designed specifically for, or with the explicit need for to solve a social need, the benefits derived can not be ignored.
In an article in Standford Social Innovation Review, Carl Schramm, CEO of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, walks us through why we shouldn’t ignore the contributions of regular entrepreneurs.
He builds his thoughts around the process of development and entrepreneurship that the United States of America went through. For example, he points to how delivering improvements in health care are always perceived as being social value that the government or non-profits add. However, as in the case of the U.S, private entrepreneurs and businesses have contributed significantly to improvement in health standards as government health programs.
These private sector contributions came in the form of improved quality of services that contributed significantly to overall improvement of living standards. For example, the development of the rail network lead to more movement of goods and services across the country, which in turn enabled cash-strapped Americans to earn a higher wage, and live better lives. Another example he sites is that of the growth of industry that lead to better quality clothing and shelter – two other goods that Americans in the mid-19th century did not have access to. Improvements in these three areas lead to unprecedented rates of change in the 19th century.
Schramm moves on to draw a parallel to 21st century development efforts. Case in point: cell phones. While disease still plauges much of the world today, as it did 19th century America, the power of the cell phone to overcome these difficulties has been remarkable. While cell phones themselves can not cure disease, Schramm points out that they have been and can be instrumental in developing new business models, companies and technologies, and as a consequence have a direct bearing on economic growth.
In conclusion Schramm does not belittle the efforts of social entrepreneurs, or even programs targetted at improving development indicators. Rather the point he reiterates that in the years to come larger social change will be had as a result of the work of regular entrepreneurs. And therefore, they must also be lauded in their role in improving society.
Read the complete article here.
Social Entrepreneurship = Social Transformation?
There is no doubt that entrepreneurship in different forms has lead to social transformation. There is invariably a ripple effect on several spheres, including politics and society. Social enterprises are no exception to the power of transformation.
What are the factors that are commonly associated with social enterprises? Do successful enterprises have anything in common at all? Authors Sarah H. Alvord, David Brown and Christine W. Letts of the Kennedy School of Government take a look at seven social enterprises to establish this.
The findings are presented in their paper, “Social Entrepreneurship and Social Transformation: An Exploratory Study.” The study looked at the following enterprises:
- BRAC, Bangladesh
- The Green Belt Movement, Kenya
- The Highlander Research and Education Center, USA
- Plan Puebla, Mexico
- SEWA, India
- Grameen Bank, Bangladesh
- Six-S, Burkina Faso and France
The study identified several forms of core innovation, including building local capacity, innovative ways of disseminating a group of innovations, and building a movement from grassroots alliances to take on the more powerful. These findings form a part of the first hypothesis for successful social entrepreneurship.
The second hypothesis the study makes is that successful social enterprises involve innovations that mobilize existing assets of marginalized groups. An example of this would be the work of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which encourages its clients to participate more effectively in local economies.
The third hypothesis for a successful social enterprise is that success is built when there is an emphasis on systematic learning in order to operate at scale.
Read more about the study here.